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NOTES
use his remedies of appeal or injunction to prevent the unau-
thorized seizure and sale. However, the creditor's suit for a de-
ficiency judgment does not involve the policy considerations of
protecting third persons who purchase at judicial sales. There-
fore, since the bona fide purchaser doctrine is not applicable, the
court in League approves the general principle that a debtor
beset by executory proceedings is not required to attack the
seizure and sale of the property in order to assert defenses to
the deficiency judgment. He may wait to do so until a deficiency
judgment is actually sought against him.2
Samuel A. Blaize
COMMUNITY OF ACQUETS AND GAINS-ANTENUPTIAL
OBLIGATIONS OF THE HUSBAND-ARTICLE 2403
Proceedings were instituted to enforce a judgment rendered
against a husband prior to his marriage by garnishment of his
wife's salary, and community funds in a joint bank account.
Judgment debtor and his wife intervened, praying that the
garnishment be dissolved and that the judgment creditor be
enjoined from obtaining execution against these assets. Held,
the wife's salary and community funds in a joint bank account
are not subject to garnishment to pay an antenuptial obliga-
tion of the husband. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Green,
252 La. 227, 210 So.2d 328 (1968).
The Civil Code does not mention the right of creditors of
either the husband or wife to have execution against the com-
munity assets. This is understandable. As Article 2807 states,
"the community of property ... is the effect of a contract" and
contracts create rights only between the contracting parties.3
Furthermore, the articles on the community are found in the
title captioned "Of The Marriage Contract, And Of the Respec-
tive Rights Of The Parties In Relation To Their Property. ' ' 4
22. LeBlanc v. Rock, 84 So.2d 629 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1955).
1. It was assumed without question that the wife's salary was a community
asset. The classification of a wife's salary was made uncertain by La. Acts
1912, No. 170. However, Houghton v. Hall, 177 La. 237, 148 So. 37 (1933) held
that the earnings of the wife living with her husband were not affected by this
amendment to LA. CIV. CODE art. 2334.
2. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2807: "The community of property, created by marriage
is not a partnership; it is the effect of contract governed by rules prescribed for
that purpose in this Code."
3. Id. art. 1901: "Agreements legally entered into have the effect of laws
on those who have formed them."
4. Id. bk. III, tit. VI.
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This title clearly emphasizes both the contractual nature of the
community regime and the fact that it concerns only the rela-
tions of the spouses to each other. Thus, the rights of creditors
of either husband or wife to seize the community assets must
depend on the respective rights of the spouses in these assets.
Previously, the court has allowed the husband's antenuptial
creditors to obtain satisfaction from community assets. In Davis
v. Compton the court, basing its conclusion on an analysis of
the husband's power as head and master of the community, said:
"As the husband has the right to alienate the effects of the
community without the consent of his wife, the creditor of
the husband before the marriage ought also to have the right
to seize the effects of the community to satisfy these claims."'
In Green, the court relied on cases which have described the
wife's interest in the community as ownership rather than an
expectancy and discredited the Davis reasoning, stating that the
decision "was based solely.. . on the false assumption that the
wife's interest is a mere expectancy." 7 Then as a further ground
for its decision, the court added that the husband's power to
alienate the community assets without his wife's consent did not
imply a right for his separate creditors to seize these assets "in
face of the positive pronouncement" of Article 2403 that the
"debts of both the husband and wife, anterior to the marriage,
must be acquitted out of their own personal and individual ef-
fects."'
Even though the wife's interest in the community assets was
termed an expectancy in Davis, such a characterization was by
no means integral to the theory which the case advanced.
Regardless of the name by which the wife's interest is des-
ignated, the community assets are subject to the husband's con-
trol, and this control is the primary basis of the Davis reason-
ing." The cases in which the court described the wife's interest
5. 13 La. Ann. 396 (1858).
6. Davis v. Compton, 13 La. Ann. 396 (1858).
7. United States Fid. & Guar. v. Green, 252 La. 227, 229, 210 So.2d 328, 330
(1968).
8. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2403: "In the same manner, the debts contracted during
the marriage enter into the partnership or community of gains, and must be
acquitted out of the common fund, whilst the debts of both husband and wife,
anterior to the marriage, must be acquitted out of their own personal and in-
dividual effects."
In Fazzio v. Krieger, 226 La. 511, 76 So.2d 713 (1954), the court construed
article 2403 in a similar manner; however, the decision was based on another
ground.
9. In Davis v. Compton, 13 La. Ann. 396 (1858), the court based its decision
on the husband's control over the community assets and then mentioned the
eventual nature of her interest as an additional ground.
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as ownership were not concerned with the rights of the husband's
antenuptial creditorso and admit that the wife's ownership is
subject to the husband's power under Article 2404.11 The power
of the husband as head and master should then be examined
to determine whether his control over these assets is sufficient
to justify the Davis conclusion that seizure should be permitted.
Article 240412 outlines the husband's power as head and
master of the community. He administers the assets, disposes
of the fruits which they produce, and except as specifically
limited in particular instances 1 3 and sell both the movables and
immovables without the consent of his wife. Moreover, his power
of disposition is not limited to onerous conveyances. He can also
make valid donations of particular movables to the benefit of
any person. On the other hand, donations of immovables and of
all or a quota of the movables are prohibited. The court has
ruled that these transfers are nullities; however, the action to
recover these assets does not arise until the dissolution of the
community.1 4 With these exceptions, all dispositions by the
husband are within his power as head and master.
10. See, e.g., Azar v. Azar, 239 La. 941, 120 So.2d 485 (1960) (wife has no
action to set aside her husband's sale of community property as long as the com-
munity exists) ; Succession of Wiener, 203 La. 649, 14 So.2d 475 (1943) (only
one-half the value of the former community should be included in a man's succession
in computing inheritance tax); Phillips v. Phillips, 160 La. 813, 107 So. 584(1926) (considered the effect of the wife's failure to accept the community
within thirty days after separation from bed and board).
11. See, e.g., Phillips v. Phillips, 160 La. 813, 826, 107 So. 584, 588 (1926)
"[T]he wife has.., the absolute ownership of half the community property dur-
ing the existence of the marriage, subject of course to the husband's power of
administration." (Emphasis added.)
12. LA. CIv. CoD art. 2404: "The husband is the head and master of the
partnership or community of gains; he administers its effects, disposes of the
revenues which they produce, and may alienate them by an onerous title, without
the consent and permission of his wife.
"He can make no conveyance inter vivos, by a gratuitous title, of the im-
movables of the community, nor of the whole, or of a quota of the movables, unless
it be for the establishment of the children of the marriage. A gratuitous title
within the contemplation of this article embraces all titles wherein there is no
direct, material advantage to the donor.
"Nevertheless he may dispose of the movable effects 'by a gratuitous and
particular title, to the benefit of all persons.
"But if it should be proved that the husband has sold the common property,
or otherwise disposed of the same by fraud, to injure his wife, she may have her
action against the heirs of her husband, in support of her claim in one-half of the
property, on her satisfactorily proving the fraud."
13. Id. art. 2334: " .... Where the title to immovable property stands in the
names of both the husband and wife, it may not be leased, mortgaged or sold by
the husband without the wife's written authority or consent where she has made
a declaration by authentic act that her authority and consent are required for
such lease, sale or mortgage and has filed such a declaration in the mortgage and
conveyance records of the parish in which the property is situated." See LA. R.S.
9:2801-2804.
14. Melady v. Bonnegent, 142 La. 534, 77 So. 143 (1917) ; Bister v. Menge,
21 La. 216 (1869).
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It is arguable that Article 2403 prohibits voluntary payment
of antenuptial debts out of community funds and thereby limits
the husband's control of these assets under Article 2404. In
Davis, however, the court held that this provision must be
construed with Article 2403 and ruled that payment from the
community is permissible. Consistent with this analysis, Article
2403 provides that these obligations are not ultimate charges
of the community and establishes an accounting principle which
applies upon dissolution if antenuptial obligations of either
spouse have in fact been paid with community funds. 15 This
interpretation of the Code is confirmed by an examination of
the counterpart of Article 2404 in the Digest of 1808.1 As well
as acknowledging the husband's power to sell and donate the
community assets, the article contained a statement that the
wife had "no sort of right" in the community assets until her
husband's death. If she had no interest in these assets, her
husband's unrestricted right under Article 2404 to alienate them
must certainly have included the right to transfer them in pay-
ment of his antenuptial obligations.
This statement negating the existence of an enforceable in-
terest is seemingly inconsistent with the ownership theory cur-
rently advanced in the jurisprudence. However, the classifica-
tion of the wife's interest is not pertinent here. What is pertinent
is the extent of the husband's control over these assets, and this
statement in the Digest of 1808 emphasized that his control was
complete. Because the Code of 1825, to protect the wife, slightly
limited the husband's power to alienate the community prop-
erty-his donative powers were limited to particular movables-
the statement regarding the wife's lack of interest was logically
deleted. But in no other way was the husband's control decreased.
Because his control over them is so extensive, it is logical to
regard these assets as the husband's so far as third persons
are concerned. This interpretation is in accordance with the
Spanish background of the Louisiana community regime.17
15. Davis v. Compton, 13 La. Ann. 396 (1858).
16. La. Digest of 1808, bk. III, tit. V, art. 66: The husband is the head and
master of the partnership or community of gains; he administers said effects;
disposes of the revenues which they produce, and may sell and even give the same
without the consent and permission of the wife, because she has no sort of
right in them until her husband be dead." See 3 LA. LEGAL ARCHIVES, COMPILED
EDITIONS OF THE CIVIL CODES OF LOUISIANA 1322 (1942).
17. According to the notes of Moreau Lislet, one of the redactors of the
Digest of 1808, the sources of the articles on the community of acquets and gains
are predominately Spanish. See A REPRINT OF MOREAu LISLET'S COPY OF A
DIGEST OF THE CIVIL LAWS Now IN FORCE IN THE TERRITORY OF ORLEANS, 1808,
at 337-41 (1968). A similar opinion is expressed in Dixon v. Dixon's Exr's, 4
La. 188 (1832).
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Manresa, a highly respected twentieth century commentator,
states that during the marriage the assets of the community
are regarded as though they were a part of the husband's
patrimony. As to third persons, the husband and the community
are one. 8 Under the foregoing analysis it is reasonable to allow
the husband's separate creditors to seize the community assets.
To recognize this right in the creditors is consistent with Article
3182: "Whoever has bound himself personally, is obliged to ful-
fill his engagements out of all his property, movable and im-
movable, present and future."
If Article 2403, as Green states, prevents the husband's ante-
nuptial creditors from obtaining execution against the com-
munity assets, that is, if the community assets are not part of
the husband's patrimony as far as third parties are concerned,
then this article must also forbid the husband to pay such debts
voluntarily with these assets. If this is so, it is contrary to the
provisions of Article 2404. The Green case did not consider this
question, but the prior jurisprudence has always allowed the
husband to use the community funds in this manner.19 It seems
doubtful that the court intended to so restrict the husband's
power as head and master.
As the court observed, to allow the husband's antenuptial
creditors to seize the community assets could prejudice the wife
if at dissolution her husband lacks sufficient assets with which
to reimburse her. In Green, this potential injustice seems more
dramatic since the wife herself is the source of the community
funds which are to be garnished. However, the effect of the
Green case on creditors cannot be denied. As a result of this
decision a man without separate assets can suspend, if not defeat,
the rights of his unsecured creditors simply by marriage. It
is quite possible that the Green decision will make it difficult
for single men to obtain credit without specific security. Thus,
strict adherence to this decision will result in abuses to creditors
which will appear at least as dramatic as the potential injury
to the wife if seizure had been permitted. Any arbitrary solu-
18. Manresa also explains that this analysis is somewhat attenuated by
several provisions of the present Spanish Code, including Article 1410, which
conditions seizure by antenuptial creditors on several factors. These limitations are
noted hereafter in the text. The following is one of Manresa's statements which
supports the general concept expressed in the text above: "De este exceso de fa-
cultades del marido se deducen dos consecuencias importantes.... Es la otra que,
ante los terceros, el marido V la sociedad son, en tdrminos generales, una sola y
misma cosa, algo que se confunde V se identifica en cuanto es posible sostener tal
confusidn." MANRESA, COMMENTARIoS AL C6DIGO CML ESPAROL arts. 1412-1416(1950).
19. There are no cases denying this power.
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tion such as allowing garnishment only of the community assets
contributed by the husband cannot be justified in principle since
there is no distinction within our community structure between
assets contributed by the husband and those contributed by the
wife.
Certainly, the considerations in the Green case illustrate the
need for legislative reform of our community system. The wife's
interest in community assets should be protected, but at the
same time the creditor's rights should not be defeated. Within
a framework similar to Louisiana's, the Spanish allow execution
against the community assets if the husband has insufficient
separate assets but only if such seizure will not interfere with
the payment of obligations contracted since marriage." There
are of course other possibilities. For the present, however, it
seems preferable to follow the traditional interpretation of the
law and allow execution against the community assets. Then
if the community is solvent upon dissolution, the wife can be
reimbursed 2 1 and prejudice to both wife and creditor can be
avoided.
George L. Bilbe
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-WRONGFUL DEATH-ILLEGITIMATE
CHILDREN-EQUAL PROTECTION
An action was brought in behalf of five illegitimate children
for the wrongful death of their mother. The district court dis-
missed the suit holding that these children have no right of
action since the word "child" in Louisiana Civil Code Article
23151 did not include illegitimate children. This decision was
20. C6DIGO CIVIL ESPAROL arts. 1408, 1410.
21. If a separate obligation of one spouse has been paid with community
funds, then the other spouse should be reimbursed one-half the amount of this pay-
ment at dissolution. This procedure is implicit in LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2403 and
2408 and is the method of accounting proposed in Davis v. Compton, 13 La. Ann.
396 (1858).
1. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2315 provides: "Every act whatever of man that causes
damage to another obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it.
"The right to recover damages to property caused by an offense or quasi of-
fense is a property right which, on the death of the obligee, is inherited by his
legal instituted, or irregular heirs, subject to the community of the surviving
spouse.
"The right to recover all other damages caused by an offense or quasi offense,
if the injured person dies, shall survive for a period of one year from the death of
the deceased in favor of: (1) the surviving spouse and child or children; (2)
the surviving father and mother of the deceased, or either of them, if he left
no spouse or child surviving; and (3) the surviving brothers and sisters of the
deceased, or any of them, if he left no spouse, child, or parents surviving. The
survivors in whose favor this right of action survives may also recover the
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